AEGIS Capability Model
Architectural Enforcement & Governance of Intelligent Systems
Version: 0.2
Status: Informational
Part of: AEGIS Architecture
Author: Kenneth Tannenbaum
Last Updated: March 6, 2026
Purpose
The capability model defines how requested actions are represented, authorized, constrained, and executed under governance.
Every executable action is expressed as a capability request.
Capability Definition
A capability is a typed permission for a specific action domain.
Format:
<domain>.<operation>[.<suboperation>]
Examples:
filesystem.readnetwork.http_postdata.database_querycompute.process_spawn
Request Contract
Minimum capability request fields:
agent_idcapabilityresourcescopecontext
Full schema reference:
docs/architecture/CAPABILITY_SCHEMA.md
Capability Lifecycle
- Define capability in registry.
- Grant capability to eligible actors.
- Receive request for capability use.
- Evaluate policy and risk.
- Return decision (
ALLOW,CONSTRAIN,ESCALATE,DENY). - Enforce decision at Tool Proxy.
- Record immutable audit event.
Capability Categories
| Category | Examples | Typical Risk Profile |
|---|---|---|
| Filesystem | filesystem.read, filesystem.write | Low to medium |
| Network | network.http_get, network.http_post | Low to high |
| Data | data.database_query, data.api_call | Medium to high |
| Compute | compute.process_spawn | High |
| Configuration | system.config_update | High to critical |
Enforcement Semantics
Allow
- Request proceeds without added constraints.
Constrain
- Request proceeds with required limits (rate, timeout, scope, size).
Escalate
- Request requires secondary authority before execution.
Deny
- Request is blocked; no execution is permitted.
Capability Scope Model
Scope is mandatory for containment and least privilege.1
Examples:
single_filedirectoryread_onlyappend_onlysubprocess
Scope MUST be enforceable by runtime controls, not advisory metadata.
Capability Grant Model
Grant rules:
- Grants are actor-specific and revocable.
- Missing grant yields immediate deny.
- Temporary grants must include expiration metadata.
Bulk grant and revoke operations must preserve audit history.
Safety Invariants
- No execution without a capability request.2
- No capability request without identity attribution.2
- No privileged scope without explicit policy support.
- No unresolved escalation may execute.
Verification Criteria
- Unknown capability requests always denied.
- Revoked capabilities cannot be used.
- Scope constraints enforced at runtime.
- Every execution maps to capability + decision + audit ID.
References
Footnotes
-
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Zero Trust Architecture, NIST SP 800-207, Aug. 2020. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207. See REFERENCES.md. ↩
-
J. P. Anderson, “Computer Security Technology Planning Study,” Deputy for Command and Management Systems, HQ Electronic Systems Division (AFSC), Hanscom Field, Bedford, MA, Tech. Rep. ESD-TR-73-51, Vol. II, Oct. 1972. See REFERENCES.md. ↩ ↩2